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Introduction: Hegel, Wittgenstein, Identity,
Difference
We cannot but begin this volume with Wittgenstein’s famous remark that “Hegel
seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are real-
ly the same.Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same
are really different.” (MDC: p.157) This is, however, a casual remark, and it seems
that we should not put too much emphasis on it. (For a discussion of how the
remark should properly be understood, see Chapter 20.) In compiling this collec-
tion of essays we adopted from this remark the idea that the problem of differ-
ence in identity is the common topic between Hegel and Wittgenstein.¹ The re-
mark presents a certain interplay (or, one might say, dialectics) of identity and
difference. And it is questions of identity and difference between Hegel and Witt-
genstein (with respect to certain aspects of their works, under certain interpreta-
tions, etc.) that are addressed by the essays in this volume.
There are systematic reasons for investigating commonalities and differences
between two philosophers: for example, that they approached the same problem
or topic using the same or different methods and arrived at the same or opposed
conclusions. Such an investigation might be conducted ahistorically, without tak-
ing into account possible lines of influence. This would, however, contradict He-
gel’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophical doctrines. Before we set about looking at
particular points of identity and difference discussed in this volume, let us look
at the philosophical and historical context of this topic.
Analytic–continental split
One of the reasons for bringing Hegel and Wittgenstein together is to overcome
or even go beyond what is known as the “analytic–continental split”.² As is well
known, at the beginning of the 20th century Russell and Moore, the founding fa-
thers of analytic philosophy, revolted against Hegelianism. Analytic philosophy
 For the sake of brevity, throughout this introductory chapter I shall use names of thinkers, par-
ticularly Hegel and Wittgenstein, metonymically, with the names standing for their philosophical
thought and the works where their thought is expressed.
 The analytic–continental split has been addressed in many different ways (cf. Bell et al. (2016)
for a representative sample of recent debates).
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became an explicitly anti-Hegelian philosophical movement (cf. Chapter 1 of this
volume). Moreover, Hegel’s writings were declared to be examples of nonsense,
of nonsensical combinations of letters and words. No dialogue is possible with
nonsense. On the other hand, continental philosophy (from Marxism to existen-
tialism and structuralism) endorsed, albeit quite selectively, some Hegelian ter-
minology, approaches, doctrines and arguments (cf. Nuzzo 2010: p.3).
All this, however, has turned out to be a myth rather than an accurate de-
scription of the philosophical landscape of the 20th century. Moore and Russell
revolted against British idealism,which drew on a specific interpretation of some
Hegelian doctrines but was opposed to Hegel in some respects. Continental phi-
losophy was, in several important respects, very much opposed to Hegel or He-
gelianism (we could mention, say, Heidegger or Adorno). To identify continental
philosophy as Hegelian in essence is, to say the least, problematic.
To situate Wittgenstein within analytic philosophy seems to be less problem-
atic. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is without doubt one of the canonical texts of an-
alytic philosophy. Things get complicated with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.
Some of the key insights brought up in the Philosophical Investigations (e.g.,
meaning as use, the private language argument, the critique of ostensive defini-
tion) were later taken up in ordinary language philosophy and by analytic phi-
losophers such as Quine, Davidson and Sellars. There are, however, other no
less important insights and aspects in Wittgenstein’s later thinking that are op-
posed to mainstream analytic philosophy, such as his conception of philosophy
as therapy, his anti-naturalism and the fragmentary style of his writing.
Hence, Hegel’s philosophy does not quite belong to continental philosophy
and Wittgenstein’s (later) philosophy does not quite belong to analytic philoso-
phy, although there are non-empty intersections in both cases. If any points of
contact between Hegel and Wittgenstein are of relevance to the analytic–conti-
nental split, then it must be ones along these intersections. Several chapters
in this volume (Stekeler-Weithofer’s, Rentsch’s, and Chiurazzi’s) address the
complicated relevance of Hegel and Wittgenstein to the analytic–continental
split, as well as the possibility of overcoming it.
The story of the Hegel–Wittgenstein affinity
It is not the case that Wittgenstein has been discussed only in analytic philoso-
phy and Hegel only in continental philosophy.Whereas Wittgenstein reception in
continental philosophy is not so significant (although see Chiurazzi’s and Haas’s
chapters in this volume, which take broadly continental perspectives), there has
been an increasing interest in Hegel and Hegelian themes in analytic philosophy
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since the 1990s, which has brought Hegel closer to Wittgenstein. It is not difficult
to find remarks in Hegel that to some extent capture the essence of analytic phi-
losophy. He wrote in the preface to the second edition of the Science of Logic
that: “The forms of thought are first set out and stored in human language”
(SL 2010: p.12; written in 1831, a few days before Hegel’s death). Before examin-
ing this renewed interest in Hegel in the 1990s, let us go back to two important
philosophers who approached our topic in surprising depth.
John Niemeyer Findlay (1903–1987) was initially a Hegelian scholar. Later, in
the 1930s, he was a student of Wittgenstein in Cambridge. Eventually, he turned
back to Hegelianism and became a fierce critic of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and
influence. His books Hegel: A Re-examination (1958) and Wittgenstein: A Critique
(1984) were written with full knowledge of both philosophers. The major parallel
that Findlay identified between the conceptions of philosophy in Hegel and Witt-
genstein is as follows:
Wittgenstein says: “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our understanding
through the instruments of our speech.” [PI: §109] Hegel says in highly similar language:
“The battle of Reason consists in this, to overcome the rigidity which the Understanding
has brought in.” [EL 1830: §32]³
The crucial point of this parallel is the implicit assumption that Hegel and Witt-
genstein used “understanding” (Verstand) in a more or less similar way (“in
highly similar language”). Findlay was, of course, aware of this complex issue
(cf. 1958: pp.62–3). For both Hegel and Wittgenstein, philosophical language con-
sists of exaggerations of ordinary language. Yet philosophical exaggerations
“will have ‘gone back’, much as the various colours vanish and annul each
other in the integrity of white light” (1958: p.27). There is one major difference,
however, which appertains to the final goal of this philosophical method:
[W]hile for Wittgenstein philosophical exaggerations disappear in this final ordinariness,
and need not, except for a confusion, have emerged at all, for Hegel their emergence is es-
sential to the final result, and is in some sense “preserved” in it. (ibid.)
 Findlay 1958: p.27. In his foreword to Hegel’s Logic (1973), Findlay uses a slightly different
wording: “Hegel anticipates even the ring of certain pronouncements of modern linguistic phi-
losophy: where Wittgenstein makes it the task of the linguistic philosopher to cure the bewitch-
ment of the understanding through the instruments of our speech (Philosophical Investigations,
§ 109), Hegel says that ‘the battle of reason is the struggle to break up the rigidity to which the
understanding has reduced everything’, the understanding being the form of thought which con-
tinues to apply rigid rules and categories, which apply well in ordinary finite contexts, to the
new, fluid, iridescent contexts and objects of Reason.”
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It is noteworthy that there is no consensus within contemporary Wittgenstein
scholarship as to the goal of his philosophical method. There have been interpre-
tations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy stressing that the unspeakable remains pre-
served in the final result.⁴
Two chapters in this volume discuss Findlay’s work. In Chapter 9, Paul Redd-
ing focuses on Findlay’s critique of the Tractarian conception of simple objects
from Hegel’s point of view. Karl-Friedrich Kiesow, in Chapter 21, addresses Fin-
dlay’s discussion of personal pronouns in Hegel and Wittgenstein.
David Lamb, in two book-length studies (1979, 1980) and other shorter
works, made a heroic attempt to bring Hegel and Wittgenstein closer to each
other. At the end of the 1970s,Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was at the height
of its dominance in analytic philosophy. Lamb’s aim in showing similarities be-
tween Hegel and Wittgenstein was twofold: to “reveal that Wittgenstein’s contri-
bution is not such a break with the past as many of his disciples would have us
think” (1980: p.xiii) and to “render Hegel intelligible to the twentieth-century
perspective” (ibid.). According to Lamb, the basic parallel between Hegel and
Wittgenstein is that they both move from a critical to a descriptive philosophy.
The point of departure for Hegel’s move is Kant’s transcendental philosophy,
whereas Wittgenstein moves from his early philosophy to his later thinking:
Of particular concern will be the move from a critique of language (Tractatus) to a descrip-
tion of its use (Blue and Brown Books, and Philosophical Investigations) by Wittgenstein,
which is in many ways parallel to the move from a Kantian critique of reason to Hegel’s
phenomenological description of the various shapes of consciousness in the Phenomenol-
ogy. (1980: p.5)
Lamb thus interprets the Tractatus as a Kantian work that aims to delineate a
priori limits of thinking and define the essence of language (the general form
of propositions), which parallels Kant’s attempts to locate the foundation and
scope of human knowledge. Lamb finds in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy
“many of the old idealist arguments in a new form” (1979: p.xi).
 Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus that philosophy “will mean the unspeakable by clearly
displaying the speakable” (4.115, Ogden/Ramsey’s trans.). Furthermore, what Wittgenstein
wrote about Uhland’s poem “Count Eberhard’s Hawthorn” seems equally true of the early Witt-
genstein’s ideal of philosophical writing: “This is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is
unutterable then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be—unutterably—contained in what
has been uttered!” (Engelmann 1968: p.7 [9 April 1917])
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The Sellarsian reception of Hegel through
Wittgenstein
Richard Rorty (1997: p.8) once spoke in this connection of “an attempt to usher
analytic philosophy from its Kantian to its Hegelian stage”.⁵ Paul Redding (2007)
speaks of the return of “Hegelian thought” in analytic philosophy, Tom Rock-
more (2001) of the “Hegelian turn” and Angelica Nuzzo (2010: p.2) of a
“Hegel-Renaissance”. Following Rockmore (2001: p.360), I would like to high-
light that Hegelian themes relevant in analytic philosophy are, for the most
part, also Wittgensteinian themes; they lie at the above-mentioned intersection.
Hegel reception in analytic philosophy goes back to Sellars’ critique of the
myth of the given and his quite selective interest in Hegel. A critique of what Sell-
ars labels the myth of the given, that is, the myth of direct or unmediated epis-
temic access to given sensory experience, can be found in the “Sense-Certainty”
chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology and in Wittgenstein’s critique of ostensive def-
inition at the beginning of his Philosophical Investigations. Despite many differ-
ences, Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s arguments boil down to the fact that seemingly
direct pointing at sensory experience (to “this” and “now”) presupposes complex
cognitive or grammatical structures.⁶
There are other Hegelian insights that Sellars introduced to analytic philos-
ophy. Let us mention another important one: Hegel’s key claim that “everything
is an inference”⁷ became the cornerstone of contextualism and inferentialism.
“Everything” must be understood here in the context of Hegel’s logic as
“every judgement”. The truth of a judgement is thus dependent on its place with-
in a syllogism or, in contemporary terms, its role in an inferential structure or the
normative space of reasons. This is also a Wittgensteinian insight, for the con-
cept of inferential structure is close to the later Wittgenstein’s concept of lan-
guage-games (more specifically: the language of giving and asking for reasons,
 One can speculate what the next “phase” of analytic philosophy will be. Perhaps a Marxist
one or even a “Deleuzian turn” as suggested by Lumsden (2011).
 This is not to say that the myth of the given can be attacked only from a Hegelian or a Witt-
gensteinian perspective, as Donald Davidson’s critique of the myth proves.
 “Alles ist ein Schluß” (E I: §181); other translations are “everything is a syllogism” (EL 1830/
2010: p.254) and “all things are a syllogism” (SL 2010: p.593). To translate Schluß as mere “infer-
ence” is already a move towards Sellars’ and Brandom’s interpretation of Hegel’s logic. Di Gio-
vanni also translates Schluß as “syllogistic inference” (ibid.), which is probably a more accurate
translation.
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in Sellars’ and Brandom’s case).⁸ Ultimately, we can understand Hegel’s slogan
“Everything is an inference” as affined to Wittgenstein’s “Meaning is use”.
Like most previous Hegel reception, Sellars’ reading of Hegel is quite selec-
tive. He incorporated some Hegelian topics into his system, while ignoring oth-
ers; moreover, Sellars’ system is party openly anti-Hegelian. Sellars (and Bran-
dom) ignore Hegel’s main concept of self-consciousness. His system ignores
Hegel’s idealism and, in the end, he endorses linguistic nominalism, epistemic
empiricism and metaphysical realism,which are all anti-Hegelian doctrines. Sell-
ars was no Hegelian, nor was he a Wittgensteinian. Rather, he took important
impulses and developed themes that fall within the intersection of Hegel’s
and Wittgenstein’s thinking.
Before moving on to the “Pittsburgh Neo-Hegelians”, John McDowell and
Robert Brandom,⁹ let us mention Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer’s book Hegels Analy-
tische Philosophie: Die Wissenschaft der Logik als kritische Theorie der Bedeutung
(1992), which anticipates many central insights of Brandom’s inferentialism and
his semantic interpretation of Hegel.
McDowell (1996) focuses on the Kantian roots of Sellars’ philosophy and
shows why it is necessary, for Sellars and for analytic philosophy in general,
to go beyond Kant’s transcendental idealism towards Hegel’s absolute idealism.
McDowell develops Sellars’ critique of the (doctrine of) givenness and argues
that the structure that must be presupposed in any given experience is best con-
ceived as the Aristotelian substance. McDowell, however, insists on Sellars’ em-
piricism, which does not contradict his minimally or non-standard empiricist in-
terpretation of Hegel.¹⁰ The idea is that it is a mistake to interpret either Kant’s or
Hegel’s idealism as lacking empirical constraints on knowledge: that is, mental
events and perceptual experience can be justifications for beliefs. Then, howev-
er, Sellars’ critique of the myth of the given rests, in McDowell’s view, on a mis-
taken interpretation of Hegel. In this context, McDowell’s Hegel can be deployed
against analytic criticism of empiricism, which includes the later Wittgenstein
(cf. Rockmore 2005: p.147).
 On the analogy between Wittgenstein’s language-games and Sellars’ space of reasons, see
Sellars (1954) and Rockmore (2005: p.145). Furthermore, Koreň and Kolman (2018: p.31) conceive
Wittgenstein’s concept of language-game as Hegelian.
 McDowell and Brandom are not the only ones who have developed Sellars’s Wittgensteinian–
Hegelian legacy. Terry Pinkard’s book Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (1994) ap-
peared in the same year as Brandom’s Make It Explicit and McDowell’s Mind and World. How-
ever, Pinkard’s focus is primarily on Hegel with only passing references to Wittgenstein.
 Cf. Rockmore (2005: p.146) and Redding (2007: p.24).
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In contrast to Sellars’ and McDowell’s selective reception of Hegel, Brandom
attempts to provide a genuine reading that he calls the semantic interpretation,
which allows him to assimilate Hegel into the analytic tradition in the wake of
the “linguistic turn”. Brandom describes his programme as “inferentialism”.
He contrasts it to “representationalism”, which is indebted to the myth of the
given (cf. Rockmore’s discussion of representationalism in Kant and the early
and later Wittgenstein in Chapter 3). Following Koreň and Kolman (2018: p.1)
we can define inferentialism in a narrow and a broad sense.¹¹ In the narrow
sense, inferentialism is a doctrine in the philosophy of language that takes lin-
guistic meaning as being grounded in an inferential structure (and not the other
way around). In the broad sense, it is an epistemological doctrine that gives the
concept of inference a privileged explanatory role. In both senses, inferentialism
is motivated by Hegel’s above-mentioned slogan: “everything is an inference”.
The concept of inference is related to Hegel’s concepts of “determinate negation”
and “mediation”, which Brandom interprets as “material incompatibility” and
“material consequence” (where mediation/material consequence can be defined
in terms of determinate negation/material incompatibility).¹² As already men-
tioned, the concept of inferential structure also has roots in Wittgenstein’s con-
cept of a language-game. But Brandom deliberately restricts Wittgenstein’s plu-
rality of language-games into a single, most fundamental game, namely the
rationalistic and normative game of reason-giving (cf. Koreň and Kolman 2018:
p.39). Wittgenstein, in contrast, does not give priority to any particular lan-
guage-game. Brandom is also critical of Wittgenstein’s negative attitude towards
philosophical theories and sides instead with Hegel’s constructivist approach
and system-building (Brandom 2014: p.7). Consider Brandom’s schematic view
of Wittgenstein’s philosophical development: “we can see the Wittgenstein of
the Tractatus as a neo-Kantian, without Kant’s residual empiricism, and the Witt-
genstein of the Investigations as a neo-Hegelian, without Hegel’s revived ration-
alism.” (Brandom 2014: p.4) Brandom is, then, a neo-Hegelian with Hegel’s ra-
tionalism and a Wittgensteinian without Wittgenstein’s anti-rationalism.
Several of the papers in this volume address and critically evaluate Brandom’s
Hegel; see Shaheen’s, Redding’s and Kolman’s chapters.
 Not to be confused with Brandom’s broad and narrow conception of inferentialism (1994:
p.131).
 Cf. Brandom (2014: p.11).
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Major interpretative approaches in Hegel and
Wittgenstein scholarship
Both Hegel and Wittgenstein scholarship have become philosophical subdisci-
plines in their own right. There have been diverse and often mutually exclusive
interpretations of both thinkers. It is not surprising that these interpretations fol-
low various aims and methodologies and place emphasis on different aspects,
such as exegetical accuracy, charity, the viability of a given philosophical posi-
tion or compatibility with other, earlier or later philosophical views and theories.
Bringing together and comparing Hegel and Wittgenstein is, then, often relativ-
ized to this or that interpretation; a certain interpretation of Hegel is compared
with a certain interpretation of Wittgenstein. The authors in this volume are not
only aware of these complications, but work creatively with them. In this section,
I want to outline the major interpretative approaches to Hegel and Wittgenstein,
and briefly discuss their possible compatibilities and irreconcilabilities. I shall
only mention the interpretative approaches that are represented in this volume.
The reception of Hegel’s thinking has been marked by (at times very creative
and productive) misunderstandings and (at times quite deliberate) misinterpre-
tations.¹³ Many readings have focused solely on one of his works or taken one
aspect of his system, one “shape of consciousness” or one particular concept
(the master–servant dialectic, the unhappy consciousness or plasticity). Such in-
terpretations are not without importance, but I will focus only on those ap-
proaches to Hegel that attempt to interpret his system as a whole. As one
would expect, there is no accepted way of classifying these interpretations. I
shall combine two recent overviews of Hegel scholarship by Terry Pinkard
(2013) and Paul Redding (2015).
The traditional metaphysical or Neoplatonic view takes Hegel’s philosophy as
a kind of rational theology. The Absolute Spirit is like the Neoplatonic or Chris-
tian God. Various stages of Hegel’s dialectic, notably various shapes of con-
sciousness presented in the Phenomenology, are interpreted as emanations of
this God. Many of Hegel’s claims and formulations support this view, e.g., his
invoking the concept of God in the preface to the Phenomenology or later claim-
ing that “philosophy has no other object but God and so is essentially rational
theology” (LA: p.101). Representative advocates of this view are Taylor (1975)
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and Beiser (2005), as well as the German scholars Heinrich (1971), Horstmann
(2006) and Siep (2014).
There are revised or realist variants of the metaphysical view, mostly Aristo-
telian (Stern 2002, Westphal 2003 and, in certain respects, McDowell 2009), but
also Spinozist (Houlgate 2005) or Platonist. It is essential for this view that real-
ity is inherently rational or conceptually structured. The concept is the funda-
mental structure of thinking as well as reality. This is true also for the traditional
view, but the revised metaphysical view does not attribute to Hegel the robust
teleological spirit monism attributed by the Neoplatonic interpretation.
The third group of interpretations takes Hegel to be carrying out, extending
and eventually completing Kant’s critique of (traditional) metaphysics. There are
many varieties of this post-Kantian view. Some of them, notably those of Pippin
(2005), Rockmore (1997), Pinkard (1994) and Gabriel and Žižek (2009), explicitly
interpret Hegel in this post-Kantian fashion. Brandom’s semantic interpretation
and inferentialism and McDowell’s interpretation are also broadly post-Kantian
(although McDowell, in contrast to Brandom, is committed to Aristotelian real-
ism). Another strand of this post-Kantian view comprises analytic–pragmatic in-
terpretations, for instance Stekeler-Weithofer (2016).
Finally, there is the view that Hegel’s philosophy does not aim to present any
(first-order) metaphysical theory, but is rather a meta-critique or a meta-meta-
physical critique of any metaphysics. The most explicit formulation of this
view is in Gabriel (2016: p.185): “Hegel’s absolute idealism is not a first-order
metaphysical view about the composition of ultimate reality […]. Rather, it is a
defence of the meta-metaphysical idea that there are different kinds of facts
[…] which share a logical structure that guarantees their overall intelligibility.”
We can already find an inclination towards this meta-metaphysical view in Fin-
dlay (1958), and more recently in Redding (2017), who focuses on Hegel’s catego-
ry of actuality (Wirklichkeit), which includes possibility and necessity as abstrac-
tions (cf. Cammi’s realist view of Wirklichkeit in Chapter 7). Hegel’s metaphysics
is, thus, a form of modal actualism that includes first-order metaphysical theo-
ries as abstractions. This view is not necessarily in conflict with the post-Kantian
interpretation (for there are meta-metaphysical aspects in Kant too). There is a
milder version of this view which holds that Hegel provides meta-metaphysical
arguments compatible with the realist view.¹⁴
 Here is an apt formulation of this view: Hegel dismisses “the question concerning whether
metaphysics tout court is possible, and [insists] on asking the ‘real’ meta-metaphysical question:
‘What kind of metaphysics is the right kind of metaphysics?’” (Giladi 2016: p.157) Giladi, how-
ever, concludes that Hegel’s metaphysics is “a sophisticated melange of Aristotelianism, Spinoz-
ism, Kantianism and post-Kantian philosophy of nature” (ibid.: p.159).
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Let us turn now to the labyrinthine world of Wittgenstein scholarship, which
in its baroque exuberance exceeds even Hegel studies. Two major interpretative
disputes will be presented here. The first is the dispute between the traditional
(or metaphysical/irresolute/theoretical/Tolstoyan) and therapeutic (or New/reso-
lute/liberatory/dialectical/Kierkegaardian/Cavellian) readings of Wittgenstein’s
philosophy, predominantly of the Tractatus (but also of later texts).¹⁵ For obvious
reasons it is useful to characterise these two groups of readings according to
their attitude to the Kantian programme of delineating the limits of knowledge.
On the traditional view,Wittgenstein provides in the Tractatus a broadly Kantian
argument that aims to delineate the limits of language.¹⁶ On the therapeutic
view, Wittgenstein is combating our natural desire for such an argument or for
metaphysics in general. The traditional view stresses the many logical, meta-
physical and epistemological insights expounded in the Tractatus; the therapeu-
tic view, in contrast, insists on the analogy with the ladder presented in the clos-
ing remarks of the treatise, which proclaim the sentences that make it up to be
nonsensical. These sentences serve as elucidations and must eventually be dis-
carded, just like “the ladder after he has climbed up it” (TLP: 6.54). This dispute
can be extended to or transposed onto Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The differ-
ence is, however, that there is no main or central argument to be identified there,
but rather several, more or less interconnected arguments which the traditional
view concentrates on. The so-called private language argument is the most fa-
mous one.
This brings us to the second main dispute, namely the debate over rules, pri-
vate language and scepticism between Saul Kripke (1982) and his opponents. The
conclusion of the private language argument (PI: §§244–271 and elsewhere)
seems to be that a language intelligible solely to its originator (i.e., a private lan-
guage) is ultimately unintelligible to this very language user. In other words,
 Cf. Crary and Read (2000), the manifesto for the therapeutic view, and a good exposition of
recent debates in Read and Lavery (2011).
 Cf. Floyd (2007: p.177): “The most fundamental divide among interpreters of Wittgenstein
lies […] between those who detect in Wittgenstein’s writings some form of semantic or epistemic
resource argument, an argument ultimately appealing to the finitude or expressive limitations of
language—whether it be truth-functional, constructivist, social-constructivist, antirealist, asser-
tion-conditionalist, formalist, conventionalist, finitist, empiricist, or what have you—and those
who instead stress Wittgenstein’s criticisms of the assumptions lying behind the desire for such
resource arguments, criticisms that in the end turn upon stressing the open-ended evolution, the
variety, and the irreducible complexity of human powers of expression. The former kind of read-
er sees the inexpressible as a limitation, a reflection of what is illegitimate in grammar or fails to
be epistemically justifiable; the latter sees the inexpressible as a fiction, an illusion produced by
an overly simplified conception of human expression.”
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there is no private language, or language is essentially social. Kripke argues that
this argument is actually a corollary of a more general paradox concerning rule-
following: “This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a
rule, because every course of action can be brought into accord with the rule.”
(PI 2009: §201) This is, for Kripke, a sceptical paradox Wittgenstein was facing
and attempting to overcome. Kripke’s solution to this paradox rests on the re-
quirement of community agreement (which is why his position is known as
the “community view”).
The opponents of the community view either deny that Wittgenstein is deal-
ing with scepticism in these passages¹⁷ or they accept the charge and present dif-
ferent solutions. There are two prominent alternatives: the disposition view
(speakers grasp a rule due to their dispositions to apply the rule in novel situa-
tions) and primitive non-reductionism (a speaker’s grasp of a rule is a primitive
mental fact about the speaker).¹⁸
* * *
Where does this very brief overview of recent interpretations of Hegel and Witt-
genstein leave us? Only a few connections between the two can be discussed
here. The traditional metaphysical view of Hegel and the traditional view of Witt-
genstein can be brought together, as in Rentsch’s, Lütterfelds’s and Kleber’s
chapters. Lamb’s proposal to interpret Wittgenstein’s early works in a Kantian
manner and Wittgenstein’s later works in a Hegelian manner is possible only
on the traditional view of Wittgenstein and the post-Kantian view of Hegel.
This interpretative strategy is advanced in Haas’, Chiurazzi’s and Pinkard’s chap-
ters (Pinkard also considers the resolute reading). Redding addresses the tradi-
tional and therapeutic readings of the Tractatus together with the post-Kantian
reading of Hegel, but eventually turns to Findlay’s modal actualism. Brandom’s
post-Kantian semantic interpretation of Hegel draws on the community view of
Wittgenstein (cf. Kolman’s and Shaheen’s chapters), while McDowell’s Wittgen-
stein is openly against the community view. The realist view of Hegel can be
compared to the traditional metaphysical interpretation of the Tractatus (as in
Cammi’s chapter). Rockmore interprets Wittgenstein, in his chapter, as “either
a metaphysical realist or an epistemic skeptic”, that is, he invokes both the tradi-
tional and sceptical views. Pluder considers the community view of rule-follow-
ing in relation to Hegel’s ethics and ethical life. Balestracci draws on the thera-
 Cf. Baker and Hacker (1984). Advocates of the resolute view would also deny that Wittgen-
stein is advancing any argument here or elsewhere.
 For the disposition view, see for example Horwich (1984); for primitive non-reductionism,
see for example McDowell (1984).
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peutic reading of the Tractatus and compares it with the dialectics of the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit. Plevrakis adopts the therapeutic view in his Hegelian inter-
pretation of the Tractatus. Moser also interprets the Tractatus within the thera-
peutic perspective (albeit in a rather unorthodox way), but her account has a
strong Kantian accent too. This is only an outline of the interpretative complex-
ities. Let us next turn to the structure and content of the volume in detail.
The structure of the volume and the individual
chapters
How to bring two different philosophers together? As we know from Fichte,¹⁹
every difference presupposes a common ground, an identity (and every identity
presupposes a ground of difference). Both Hegel and Wittgenstein followed
Fichte in this respect. Hegel did so when he maintained that everything has a
ground and everything is a judgement,²⁰ Wittgenstein when he proclaimed
self-identity to be nonsensical (for an identity without difference would be a
self-identity).²¹
Re-evaluating the differences between Hegel and Wittgenstein, then, will
consist either in highlighting their differences against the background of their
identity, or in highlighting their common points against the background of
their differences. Let us label these approaches “From identity to difference”
and “From difference to identity” respectively. The latter approach, “From differ-
ence to identity”, might be sketched as follows: let us assume that the thinking
of these two philosophers is very different (they might have different goals, use
different methods and terminology; they might differ in what they take for grant-
ed; they might focus on different topics, etc.). And this is prima facie indeed so.
Within these differences, however, one might try to find a point of contact and
establish whether they agree on some particular issue. The former approach,
“From identity to difference”, in contrast, begins by establishing a common
ground or rather a common background (a presupposition, a topic, a perspec-
 This is the distinction between a “ground of distinction” (Unterscheidungsgrund) and
“ground of relation/conjunction” (Beziehungsgrund) from the third paragraph of Fichte’s Science
of Knowledge.
 Hegel claims this at many points, e.g. in his Berlin lectures of 1831 (LL 1831: p.131).
 Curiously enough, Carlson (2005: p.xi) thinks that the denial of self-identity in Hegel consti-
tutes his fundamental difference from analytic philosophy. If that were so,Wittgenstein’s think-
ing, early and late, would also fundamentally differ from analytic philosophy.
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tive) against which a difference (in the form of a disagreement) between Hegel
and Wittgenstein can be established. This passage from identity to difference
or vice versa can be embedded in a dialectical process. Any identity (or differ-
ence) that is reached is a point of departure for a new passage towards another
difference (or identity). So Hegel and Wittgenstein may initially be taken to be
very different philosophers; next, a common ground (thesis, perspective, con-
cept) between them is established (identity), but within this common ground,
there may be specific differences.
Following this general consideration, we divided the first half of the volume
into two main sections, “From identity to difference” and “From difference to
identity”. We begin our volume with two chapters that are more general in
scope, exploring the relevance and sustainability of the analytic–continental
split.
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer investigates, from a broadly Hegelian perspec-
tive, metaphysical commitments of various strains of analytic philosophy, specif-
ically logical atomism, physical atomism, naturalism and materialism. He iden-
tifies (sometimes latent) empiricism in these movements and counters with the
Hegelian claim that “[s]cience is collective work on concepts, not merely a proc-
ess of gathering empirical facts”. These movements do not understand the so-
called “transcendental turn”, which Stekeler-Weithofer traces back to Descartes.
The materialist/mechanist/objectivist worldview amounts, in the end, to mani-
festly incoherent metaphysics.
Thomas Rentsch presents, closer to the main topic of this volume, three key
hypotheses about Hegel and Wittgenstein: (1) the proposition is the fundamental
unit of dialectics/meaning construction, (2) Hegel systematically anticipates the
thesis of meaning as use, and (3) we can find the private language argument in
Hegel.
* * *
The first major section is comprised of chapters that proceed from identity to dif-
ference, that is, they take some point of identity between Hegel and Wittgenstein
as a (sometimes only implicit) presupposition and then focus on the difference
between them.
Tom Rockmore opens his chapter with the observation that both Wittgen-
stein and Hegel challenge the view that philosophical problems can be dealt
with through a theory. They do so, however, in different ways. Although they
both aimed to bring the philosophical tradition to its end, for Wittgenstein, phi-
losophy ends in scepticism, while for Hegel this end is, at the same time, the cul-
mination of philosophy, its fulfilment.
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Herbert Hrachovec begins by remarking that both philosophers often ap-
proach philosophical problems not head-on, but by discussing (and criticising)
established cognitive attitudes. Hrachovec then focuses on their reflections on
the ordinary understanding of measurement. He proceeds by “triangulating”
Hegel and Wittgenstein vis-à-vis a non-partisan account of measurement that al-
lows one to find an interesting shared concern, namely a shared alertness to a
concealed side of standards. It is against this background affinity that some of
their differences appear in sharper contrast.
David Kolb’s point of departure is the observation that both Wittgenstein
and Hegel see our many languages and forms of life as constituted by different
diamond nets of categories or grammars. Kolb then proceeds to argue that both
Wittgenstein and Hegel take a non-reductive attitude toward this plurality of
local ontologies. They disagree, however, about the philosophical implications
of this plurality. Their disagreements stem from divergent notions about the
structure and mode of being of the diamond nets.
Jonathan Shaheen identifies an analogy or shared concern between Hegel
and Wittgenstein. They both give arguments for the social constitution of philo-
sophically central entities. Shaheen focuses on seminal interpretations of these
arguments, on Brandom’s reading of the self-consciousness chapter of the Phe-
nomenology of Spirit and on the communitarian reading of the private language
argument in the Philosophical Investigations. Against this background, several
differences are established: first, their different conceptions of mind; second,
their different accounts of the relation between time slices of a single mind
and genuine social contributions. Shaheen maintains: “Whereas communitari-
anism buys the Wittgensteinian so little that it can be had for the cost of individ-
ual time slices, the sociality Brandom is selling costs so much that the resources
it takes to buy it can equally well purchase self-consciousness with no social
contribution whatsoever.”
Lorenzo Cammi elaborates in great detail on Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s no-
tions of Wirklichkeit before attempting a comparison of them. Given Cammi’s re-
alist/metaphysical interpretations of Hegel and Wittgenstein, several common
points are established, in order to point out important differences. Both Hegel
and Wittgenstein were convinced that it is possible to know the world. Yet ac-
cording to Wittgenstein, some aspects of the world are inexpressible. In contrast
to Hegel,Wittgenstein’s notion ofWirklichkeit is restricted to empirical facts. Both
Hegel and Wittgenstein maintain that reason and the world share the same es-
sence; moreover, reason constitutes Wirklichkeit. Yet in Wittgenstein the constit-
utive role of reason is passive compared with Hegel. Hegel’s conception of the
actualisation of the world is dynamic whereas Wittgenstein’s is static.
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Kai-Uwe Hoffmann focuses on the concept of beauty. He starts out from
similarities between Hegel and Wittgenstein with regard to their critique of sci-
entism and other minor points.Within this common ground, several differences
appear:Wittgenstein would reject Hegel’s metaphysical, epistemological and sci-
entific claims concerning the concept of beauty.
* * *
The second main section groups together chapters that proceed from (sometimes
tacit) differences in order to find some common point (identity) between Hegel
and Wittgenstein.
Paul Redding begins by remarking that comparing Hegel and Wittgenstein
can be a hazardous affair. With this consideration in mind, he attempts to find
some specific points of intersection between Hegel and the Wittgenstein of the
Tractatus. More specifically, these points of contact are found between Hegel’s
(positive and negative) existential judgement and Wittgenstein’s atomic proposi-
tions. After this specific comparison is made, further Hegelian themes emerge in
the context of the Tractatus. Hegel and Wittgenstein were both opposed to the
practice, common among logicians, of generalising by eliminating singular
terms.
Terry Pinkard states at the outset that Hegel and Wittgenstein are an odd
pairing: Hegel sought unity and created a forbidding technical vocabulary; Witt-
genstein, in contrast, focused on heterogeneity (of language) and aimed at clari-
ty in philosophy. Despite these differences, however, they both shared an interest
in the (Kantian) problem of the limits of thought. Furthermore, both Wittgenstein
and Hegel rejected Kant’s sharp distinction between things in themselves and
appearances. And finally, they were both convinced that “in making sense of
things, we are inevitably driven to make sense of making sense, to a kind of
logic”.
Valentin Pluder admits that Wittgenstein and Hegel are very different kinds
of philosophers in every respect. His aim is to find a point of contact where they
can be compared. This point of contact is their concern with the connection be-
tween rules and acts: a mere formal rule cannot establish or cause interpersonal
action. This similarity lies in Hegel’s critique of Kant’s categorical imperative and
Wittgenstein’s critique of rule-following. Moreover, they also share similar solu-
tions for how to make this connection between rules and acts: there must be
some internal relation between a rule and an act. For Hegel, this relation is
the ethical life; for Wittgenstein, it is social institutions and forms of life.
Valentina Balestracci aims to investigate whether there can be a connec-
tion between Hegel and Wittgenstein. Such connections are found in comparing
tautologies and contradictions in the Tractatus on the one hand and speculative
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propositions in the Phenomenology of Spirit on the other. Moreover, Balestracci
pursues a deeper analysis of Hegel’s speculative propositions, in order to shed
light on the much-discussed relation between the Phenomenology and the Sci-
ence of Logic.
Vojtěch Kolman starts his chapter with the suggestion that Wittgenstein’s
remark that his and Hegel’s philosophies are opposed to each other can be
read with Adorno’s eyes as a critique of Hegel’s “identity philosophy”. In this
sense, Wittgenstein’s and Hegel’s. He claims that their philosophies might be
easily seen as opposedare, in some important respects, identical or similar to
each other. But this difference presupposes another kind of identity, namely
an overall commensurability of both philosophies. According to Kolman, this
identity consists in the way Hegel and Wittgenstein develop their concepts of
knowledge from more primitive forms of consciousness and bring them to a cau-
tiously optimistic closure based on the sociality of reason, particularly as mir-
rored in Hegel’s master–slave parable and Wittgenstein’s private language argu-
ment.
Ingolf Max compares the beginning of the chapter on “Being” in Hegel’s Sci-
ence of Logic (pure being without further determinations) and the first sentence
of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (“The world is everything that is the case”). Although
these accounts seem to be different or even opposed to each other, Max finds a
striking analogy between Hegel’s global identity of pure being and pure nothing
and Wittgenstein’s world as the total reality. He thus focuses on Hegel’s category
of contradiction and its Wittgensteinian counterpart.
Marco Kleber asserts at the beginning of his chapter that Wittgenstein and
Hegel have opposed views concerning the concept of the unspeakable. For Witt-
genstein, the logical form of the world is unspeakable, whereas the immediately
given, the fact, can be expressed in language. For Hegel, the immediately given is
precisely what is unspeakable. What is revealed in language is the concept,
which, according to Kleber’s metaphysical interpretation, is the logical form
and structure of all reality. Kleber thus speculatively equates Wittgenstein’s log-
ical form with Hegel’s concept.
* * *
The second half of the volume is made up of chapters that aim not at a compar-
ison but at a fresh interpretation of some aspects of Hegel’s or Wittgenstein’s
thinking. Interpretations of one of the two philosophers are inspired by or
taken from the perspective of the other. More specifically, these chapters present
either a Hegelian interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thinking or a Wittgensteinian
interpretation of Hegel’s thinking (and some, notably Kiesow’s chapter, focus
on both approaches). These perspectival approaches must presuppose that He-
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gel’s thinking is different from Wittgenstein’s; they proceed from a difference. A
successful interpretation of one of the thinkers through the lens of the other re-
veals, however, that they have something in common. Interpreting one of the
thinkers through the lens of the other is thus a special case of the approach
from the previous section, “From difference to identity”. We divided this second
part of the volume into two sections, “Hegelian approaches to Wittgenstein” and
“Wittgensteinian approaches to Hegel”. Let us begin with “Hegelian approaches
to Wittgenstein”.
Aloisia Moser concentrates on Wittgenstein’s projection method and its pri-
vation, the so-called zero-method. The zero-method is an activity of the mind
akin to the “I think” of Kant’s transcendental apperception or Hegel’s speculative
method in logic in which “method is the consciousness of the form of the inner
self-movement of the content of logic” (SL 2010: p.33). Drawing on these paral-
lels, Moser concludes that Wittgenstein’s philosophical method goes beyond
merely pointing out misunderstandings of the logic of our language. Method,
in Wittgenstein and Hegel, is something that happens within concepts.
Ermylos Plevrakis attempts to interpret the Tractatus by referring to the
reader’s thoughts, feelings and understanding, imagining that this reader is
Hegel. The core of his interpretation consists in taking the Tractarian “sole logi-
cal constant” (TLP: 5.47) as being equivalent to Hegel’s concept, as developed in
the Science of Logic. Hegel’s sole logical constant can be regarded as “something
like the missing logical elucidation of Wittgenstein’s N-operation”; it is the con-
cept of concept from the very first chapter of the Doctrine of the Concept, the se-
quence of universality, particularity and singularity.
Gaetano Chiurazzi focuses on Hegel’s discussion of Kant’s second antino-
my in order to show the anti-analytical presuppositions of Hegel’s philosophy.
He then identifies what he calls the “cosmological antinomy” of the Tractatus,
that is, its internal tension between an analytic principle (centred on the concept
of simple objects) and a synthetic one (centred on the concept of form). His He-
gelian interpretation of the Tractatus brings the logical form closer to the form of
life from Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. The logical form has “life”, or, in Hege-
lian terms, it has a “soul”; it is, in the end, a concept (as Marco Kleber and, im-
plicitly, Bruno Haas also maintain in their chapters).
Bruno Haas aims, at the outset, to address a group of philosophical prob-
lems present in the Tractatus from a Hegelian point of view. He interprets the
Tractatus as a treatise on the Being of logic, that is, a treatise aimed at making
logical form explicit. Haas focuses on Wittgenstein’s remarks on the nature of
subjectivity in relation to reference, especially 5.5422, “there is no such thing
as the soul”, which is, Haas argues, a misleading translation of “die Seele ist
ein Unding” that wrongly implies there is no such thing as an Unding. Haas
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then proceeds to provide a general characterisation of Wittgenstein’s theory of
reference, focusing on its lack of differentiation between logical levels (through
the image paradigm). He interprets this lack against the background of Hegel’s
theory of reference, as developed in his theory of contradiction.
Alexander Berg investigates what Wittgenstein actually said about Hegel
and critically evaluates these remarks. Berg considers (openly anachronistically)
what Hegel might have replied to Wittgenstein’s words about his philosophy:
“Wittgenstein seems to think that I always want to say that singular things
only get their meaning from the universality. Whereas he himself is interested
in showing that we can say this only in particular situations.”
* * *
The final group of authors aim to make contributions to Hegel scholarship from a
Wittgensteinian perspective.
Karl-Friedrich Kiesow starts out from the observation that both Hegel and
Wittgenstein were aware of the privileged position of pronouns in linguistic dis-
course. In order to make a comparison possible, he narrows down his discussion
to a critical analysis of the contributions of two distinguished interpreters of
Hegel and Wittgenstein, namely, J. N. Findlay and Paul Weiss. Kiesow focuses
on Findlay’s Wittgensteinian reading of §184 of the Phenomenology, where
Hegel presents his theory of acknowledgement, and on Weiss’s Hegelian reading
of §§220–1 of the Zettel, where Wittgenstein examines facial expressions. Findlay
adopts a standard of meaningfulness that he erroneously connects with Wittgen-
stein and, therefore, comes to the conclusion that Hegel fails to capture the nor-
mal linguistic usage. Findlay’s demand for an existential phenomenology in
which the normal usage is restored is met by Weiss, who also justifies the
need to explore the system of personal pronouns by submitting them to specu-
lative transformations.
Jakub Mácha provides a distinctively Wittgensteinian interpretation of He-
gel’s subjective logic, especially the parts on the concept, the judgment and
the Schluß. He argues that Wittgenstein implicitly recognised the moments of
universality, particularity and individuality. More specifically, the moment of par-
ticularity occupies in Wittgenstein the status of a paradigm sample which medi-
ates between a universal concept and its individual instances. Given this inter-
pretation, Mácha provides a generic account of the emergence of concrete
universals through a series of negations that follows the basic structure of He-
gel’s judgement: the individual is the universal.
Wilhelm Lütterfelds, in the sole chapter in German, understands Wittgen-
stein’s late philosophy (taken mostly from On Certainty) as a kind of linguistic
idealism. From this perspective, he interprets Hegel’s dialectic as an idealist lan-
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guage-game. The most fundamental element of this language-game lies in He-
gel’s identification of the substantial being with the subject. This identity
makes up an instrument or paradigm of this language-game (like Wittgenstein’s
measuring instrument from PI §50).
* * *
I sincerely hope that both Hegel and Wittgenstein are treated with respect in this
volume. None of the authors excessively privileges one over the other, though
they may express a preference. Hegel is not treated as the one who knew every-
thing all along, nor is Wittgenstein taken as the only philosopher that can make
Hegel intelligible.²² Situating Hegel in the Wittgensteinian tradition of analytic
philosophy and Wittgenstein in the Hegelian tradition of German idealism
may prove to be a fresh perspective in either case. In a similar way, a new per-
spective may consist in seeing Hegel through a Wittgensteinian lens or Wittgen-
stein through a Hegelian lens.
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